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I. Introduction 
 
 Household income plays an important role in the current and future health and socio-
economic outcomes of its members. Social scientists have spent a considerable amount of effort 
uncovering the theoretical and empirical linkages between household resources and human capital 
formation in children (Currie and Almond, 2011; Becker and Tomes, 1986; Duncan and Brooks-
Gunn, 1997; Cameron and Heckman, 1998; Blau, 1999). The intergenerational transmission of 
disadvantage is very closely related to factors determined by the family environment. There are well 
known confounding issues as income is closely linked to parental effort, skills and preferences, 
which directly affect children’s short- and long-term outcomes. Thus, separating out the direct 
effect of household socio-economic status on children’s wellbeing and identifying the channels that 
enable this link is an important pre-requisite for any policy intended to break the intergenerational 
transmission of human capital. Recent policy initiatives have thus called for two-generation 
programs that treat both parents in children in an effort to improve the effectiveness of pre-school 
interventions aimed at aiding disadvantaged children close the ability gap (Chase-Lansdale and  
Brooks-Gunn, 2014).  
 In this study we make two contributions directly relevant for the design of such policies. 
First, we show that improving household resources can significantly impact children’s behavioral 
and personality outcomes even in the absence of matching child-centered interventions; second, 
these effects are non-trivial among children first treated in their early teenage years.  We also focus 
on traits and conditions that have been shown to correlate with long-term socio-economic success, 
but have received less attention in the economics literature mostly because reliable data on these 
conditions are scarce. According to data from the National Health Interview Survey, in 2005-2006 
15% of US children aged 4-17 had parents who had contacted a health professional or school staff 
to talk about the child’s behavioral or emotional difficulties (NCHS Data Brief, no 8, September 
2008). Approximately one third of these children (5.1%) were prescribed medication for these 
difficulties. By 2011, 7.5% of 6-17 year olds were receiving medication for emotional and 
behavioral difficulties. Among children from families with incomes below the poverty line, this 
proportion is even higher at 9.2% (NCHS Data Brief No 148, April 2014).  
 This study is links two related, but separate branches of the literature – research on human 
capital formation, personality traits and long-term economic success; and studies on mental health 
and family socio-economic status. Most of the existing research has focused on establishing a 
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causal link between parental resources and children’s educational attainment, social outcomes or 
physical health in childhood and adulthood (see for instance Duncan et al, 1994; Duncan et al, 
1998; Shea, 2000; Plug and Vijverberg, 2003; Milligan and Stabile, 2011; Duncan et al 2011; Aizer 
et al, 2014) At the same time, studies have demonstrated that the formation of positive personality 
traits and cognitive skills is crucial in determining long-term socio-economic wellbeing and may 
have strong effects on long-term health (see Campbell et al, 2014; Cunha and Heckman (2008); 
Cunha, Heckman, and Schennach (2010)). A growing and related branch of the literature has shown 
that mental health conditions, such as attention deficit hyperactivity disorder and developmental 
delays are more likely to affect poorer children (Currie and Lin, 2007). Indeed, low SES might 
work as an early-life stressor that determines part or all of the relationship between low parental 
income and children’s mental health problems (see Lundberg, 1997; McLeod and Shanahan, 1993).  
A separate strand of the literature links childhood and adolescent cognitive and personality traits to 
long-run economic outcomes. Students who display anti-social behavior have a lower probability of 
completing high school (Duncan and Magnusson, 2010). Related research by Moffitt et al (2011) 
reports that self-control in childhood predicts health outcomes and overall socioeconomic status 
later in life.   
 In the current analysis, we examine how positive changes in unearned household income 
affect children’s behavioral disorders, emotional disorders and personality traits in their teenage 
years. Prior research has shown that human capital interventions have a short-lived effect on 
cognitive abilities except at very early ages (Heckman, Pinto and Savelyev et al, 2013). However, 
we also know that personality traits may still be malleable at older ages (Van den Akker, A. L., 
Dekovic ́, M., Asscher, J., & Prinzie, P., 2014; Terracciano, A., McCrae, R. R., & Costa, P. T. Jr., 
2006; Klimstra, T. A., Bleidorn, W., Asendorpf, J. B., van Aken, M. A. G., & Denissen, J. J. A., 
2013; Denissen, J. J. A., van Aken, M. A. G., & Roberts, B. W.,2011; Kawamoto, Tetsuya and 
Toshihiko Endo. 2015; Carneiro and Heckman, 2003; Heckman and Stixud, 2006; Meghir, Palme 
and Simeonova, 2013). Our study finds that exogenous changes in unearned household income 
have large effects on child personality traits and symptoms of emotional and behavioral distress as 
measured at age 16. Furthermore, we find that the gains are largest for the children with the most 
(pre-intervention) negative personality traits and had the most behavioral and emotional problems. 
To our knowledge, this is the first study to examine the direct effect of changes in unearned 
household income on personality traits and mental health in a quasi-experimental framework (see 
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review by Duncan, Magnuson and Votruba-Drzal, 2014).  
We use two separate, but related measures in our analysis.1 The first set of variables is based 
on diagnoses from parent-reported symptoms of behavioral or emotional disorders as defined by the 
DSM-IV. Using a slightly different sub-set of measures from the survey, we construct index 
measures for three of the Big 5 Personality traits. Our results, using either measure, accord with one 
another and indicate that there is a marked improvement for the treated cohort of children over time 
with regard to personality traits and emotional and behavioral disorders.  
 The detailed nature of our survey data allow us to also examine some of the potential 
mechanisms through which improved household income may affect the observed improvement in 
child personality traits and disorders. Previous research has suggested that parents’ emotional and 
physical well-being are affected by household income (Evans and Garthwaite (2014); Milligan and 
Stabile (2011); Jones et al (2015)). Using a cohort-level comparison Costello et al (2010) find a 
negative association between unearned income receipt and substance and alcohol abuse in the 
population we study here at age 19. Wolfe et al (2012) use casino operations to predict household 
income for American Indians in the Behavioral Risk Factors Surveillance System data. They use 
this predicted income to explain adult health outcomes and find there is a reduction in adult anxiety, 
which may also be physiologically related to children’s long-term wellbeing. High levels of 
maternal cortisol, which is closely associated with maternal stress levels during pregnancy, are 
predictive of children’s school performance ten years after birth (Aizer et al, 2014).   
Behavioral and personality traits development can be understood as the child’s response to 
the perceived environment as signaled by the atmosphere in the family. Coping mechanisms that 
prepare a child for dealing with a hostile world do not necessarily foster the personality traits and 
behaviors that promote pro-social behavior, scholastic learning and conscientiousness and may 
work in the opposite direction. On the positive side, researchers have shown that children who start 
out in households with below average parenting skills react positively when their parents receive 
interventions aimed at improving skills. Long run earnings converge to that of non-disadvantaged 
control groups in the long run (Thompson, 2014).  
 In our analysis, we examine the effect of exogenous income transfers on parental behaviors, 
																																																								
1	Appendix Table 1 provides the entire list of variables from the data set used in creating the personality trait measures 
as well as the components that are used in diagnosing the emotional or behavioral disorders. There are significant 
overlaps between emotional disorders and neuroticism; behavioral disorders and agreeableness; conscientiousness has 
some overlap with both emotional and behavioral disorders.		
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the quality of the relationship between the two parents, and the relationship between parents and 
children. We find that there is a marked improvement in parental mental health, the relationship 
with the other spouse and between the parents and children in the treated households. We also 
explore whether households move residence in response to their increased income levels. A large 
strand of the literature has examined whether the neighborhood conditions play a role in affecting 
child outcomes (Kling et al, 2007; Jacob et al, 2014; Chetty and Hendren, 2015). Our analysis finds 
some suggestive evidence that aligns with this previous research on neighborhood effects; there is 
some geographic re-location for a sub-set of households in our data due to the increased household 
incomes and that this may explain some of the improvement in child outcomes.  
 The next section discusses the existing literature related to changes in educational 
interventions on cognitive and personality traits for children. In Section 3 we discuss the data used 
in our analysis. We discuss the conceptual framework for our analysis in Section 4 and provide the 
empirical framework in Section 5. In Section 6 we provide the empirical results from our analysis 
and we investigate the mechanisms in Section 7. We conduct several robustness checks in Section 
8. In Section 9 we discuss the relationship between age 16 outcomes and long-run labor market 
outcomes for our sample population. Finally, we conclude in Section 9.  
II. Background and Related Literature   
 Several different approaches have been utilized to study the impact of extra family income 
on child outcomes. Blau (1999) in the US and Dooley and Stewart (2004) in Canada examine 
changes to permanent income in a lifecycle framework and find that they had small effects on child 
outcomes. However, a series of papers by Duncan et al (1994, 1998) and Hill et al (1987) report 
that changes in household income are associated with improvements in IQ scores, child 
achievement, children’s long-run wages and a reduction in behavioral problems. In a slightly 
different setting, Levy et al (2000) uses changes to household income over the life cycle and 
identifies their impacts using sibling pairs (born at different times) who are sufficiently different in 
age. Improving household income for one member of the sibling pair relative to the other one had a 
positive effect on educational attainment. 
 There are a series of papers that use quasi-experimental methods to examine the effect of 
changes in household income on child outcomes. The research uses exogenous shocks to parental 
income such as changes in tax policy, government transfer programs, macroeconomic conditions, 
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surprise income windfalls and crop failures to identify the direction of causality between family 
SES and child outcomes. Case (2004) found that an unexpected increase in household income due 
to pension extension in South Africa improved self-reported health, but also health for the 
household as a whole. Using the same reform Duflo (2003) finds that there is a positive effect on 
child height and weight in the treated households. Behrman, et al (2005) report on the long-term 
results from the conditional cash transfer program in Mexico (known as both Oportunidades and 
Progressa). They find that children who resided in households that participated in the program for a 
longer period of time have greater educational attainment, but not necessarily an improvement in 
test scores. Akee et al (2010) used the Great Smoky Mountain Study data to examine the effect of 
changes in household income on child educational attainment, arrests and obesity. Increased income 
has a strong effect on reducing criminality and improving educational attainment for the previously 
poorest households in a difference-in-difference framework. In Akee et al (2013), we examine the 
effect of increases in household income on childhood obesity and find that there is a difference in 
effect depending upon initial household income level. 
 Displacement of workers or economic shocks have also been used to help identify the 
impacts of a long-run change in economic conditions at the household level. The obvious difference 
with pure unearned income shocks such as the one in South Africa is that employment-related 
economic shocks may have effects on children’s outcomes beyond what is attributed to the 
immediate measurable impact on households income. Further, employment shocks are only related 
to negative earned income shocks, which may have different propagation mechanisms than positive 
unearned income shocks. Shea (2000) uses industry and job loss as an instrument for income. His 
results show no long-run effects on the child’s earnings or schooling; however, he reports some 
effects for children from households with fathers who have less than a high school degree. 
Oreopolous et al (2008) examine the effect of job displacement due to layoffs on the outcomes of 
sons from these households. The sons have lower earnings in the future and the results are primarily 
driven by children at the lowest end of the income distribution. In examining historical data for 
France in the 19th century, Banerjee et al (2007) found that in young adulthood sons from 
households residing in wine production areas affected by new grape diseases were shorter than their 
counterparts in other French provinces.  
 Finally, changes in government programs and provisions have been used extensively to 
examine how changes in household income affect long-run household outcomes. Milligan and 
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Stabile (2011) investigate how positive changes in tax benefits for households with children 
affected those children in Canada. They find that there is an increase in child test scores, height and 
health. Interestingly, the incidence of mother’s depression also decreases. In recent work in the 
same setting, Jones et al (2015) examined changes to the Canada Child Tax Benefit on child 
outcomes and investigated the mechanisms. The research indicates that increases in household 
income benefits child outcomes via two mechanisms – increased direct expenditures related to 
health and education and through a general improvement in household environment. A number of 
studies have used the introduction of the Earned Income Tax Credit as exogenous variation in 
household incomes. Evans and Garthwaite (2013) report a reduction in maternal stress and an 
overall improvement in health using biometric measures of mothers’ health. Hoynes et al (2015) 
find a reduction in low birth weight and attribute it primarily to better pre-natal care and reduction 
in maternal smoking. Dahl and Lochner (2008) show that better financial standing leads to an 
improvement in achievement test scores for low income children. Similar findings are reported by 
Morris et al (2004) who examine changes in several welfare to work programs in the US.   
Studies have also examined how distributing vouchers earmarked for specific family 
expenses affect child health and human capital. Kling et al (2007) find in the Moving to 
Opportunity data that there are strong mental health benefits of the housing voucher program for 
household mothers and for female children.  Additionally, the program found improvement for 
female children with regard to education and overall health. In a recent paper Jacob et al (2014) 
examine outcomes for poor households that receive a randomly provided housing voucher in 
Chicago in the late 1990s. The Chicago housing voucher program may have a large effect on actual 
household income by serving as a true unearned income shock, which amounted to approximately 
$12,000 per year. The study fails to find any significant effects of this income intervention on child 
outcomes. However, the authors note that most households do not relocate  and the fact that the 
neighborhood characteristics do not improve would still be reflected in the quality of schools 
attended and social environments.  
 A related literature looks at the effect of educational interventions on cognitive and 
personality skills and overall health outcomes. Gertler et al (2014) examine the long run results of a 
health program conducted in Jamaica specifically aimed to improve child cognitive abilities and 
personality skills. Twenty years later, the treated individuals earned 42 percent more. Heckman, 
Pinto and Sveleyev (2013) use data on cognitive and personality traits for participants in the Perry 
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Preschool randomized intervention to analyze the long-run effects of treatment. They find that the 
treated children have higher levels of education, employment, earnings and health than their 
untreated counterparts. They attribute this primarily to the large improvements in child personality 
traits such as a reduction in aggressive and antisocial behaviors. Increasingly researchers are finding 
evidence that personality traits and social skills matter for labor market outcomes (Deming, 2015).
 This study is related to these various literatures, but we examine the effects of an exogenous 
unearned income transfer rather than participation in educational and social programs. Prior work 
has also focused on vouchers that can be used only for a pre-defined set of expenses. Our income 
intervention comes without any conditions on the use of the income. We can also measure the 
effects of the intervention on both the parents and the children of the affected household. In prior 
work, we have found a reduction in child psychopathologies using a single differencing strategy 
(Costello et al, 2003). Our current analysis departs from our previous research by using an 
individual fixed-effects regression strategy over multiple survey waves to examine behavioral and 
emotional disorders and personality traits. We also explore the potential mechanisms in this 
analysis and find that there is strong evidence for changes in parental behavior as well.  
III. Data Description  
 
 The Great Smoky Mountains Study of Youth (GSMS) is a longitudinal survey of 1420 
children aged 9, 11 and 13 years at the survey intake, who were recruited from 11 counties in 
western North Carolina. The children were selected from a population of approximately 20,000 
school-aged children using an accelerated cohort design. 2  American Indian children from the 
Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians were over sampled for this data collection effort.3 Their federal 
reservation is situated in two of the 11 counties within the study. The initial survey contained 350 
Indian children and 1070 non-Indian children. Proportional weights were assigned according to the 
probability of selection into the study; therefore, the data is representative of the school- aged 
population of children in this region. Attrition and non-response rates across different survey waves 
were found to be equal across ethnic and income groups. The survey began in 1993 and has 
																																																								
2	See Costello E. Jane, Adrian Angold, and Barbara Burns, and Dalene Stangl, and Dan L. Tweed, and Alaatin Erkanli, 
and Carol M. Worthman (1996) for a thorough description of the original survey methodology.	
3	We provide data from the 1990 US Census in Appendix Table 12 which indicates that the percent of adults with a 
high school degree or more, unemployment rates and per capita incomes are approximately similar for this particular 
tribe as compared to other American Indian tribes. A comparison with African Americans indicates close similarities 
with regard to educational attainment and unemployment rates, however, African Americans have slightly higher per 
capita income. 
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followed these three cohorts of children annually up to the age of 16 and then re-interviewed them 
at ages 19 and 21. Both parents and children were interviewed separately up until the child was 16 
years old; interviews after that were only conducted with the child alone. Individuals are 
interviewed regardless of where they are living (whether on their own, in college, or still living with 
their parents). No child is dropped from the survey simply because they moved out of their parent’s 
home. We find no statistically significant difference due to attrition between the treatment and 
control groups. American Indians comprise 24% of the sample in the very first survey wave and 
comprise approximately 27% of the sample at age 21.The interviewers were residents of the study 
area who received one month of training for the study. They were randomly assigned to families 
across survey waves. Two of the interviewers were Native Americans and one was Cherokee. 
Families received $10 to complete the initial wave of the survey (Costello et al, 1997) and the 
compensation has increased over time.  
 After the fourth wave of the study, a casino opened on the Eastern Cherokee reservation. 
The casino is owned by the Eastern Cherokee tribal government. A portion of the profits is 
distributed on a per capita basis to all adult tribal members. Disbursements from the casino 
revenues are made on a semi-annual basis to all enrolled tribal citizens.4 There are no means testing 
or other requirements other than tribal citizenship in order to receive the payments. Individual tribal 
members are eligible for the transfer payments whether they reside on or off of the reservation; 
tribal cash transfers are based on tribal enrollment status only. The transfers amount to 
approximately $4,000 annually and are disbursed to all adult members of the tribe. This extra 
income is subject to federal income taxes. This amount is comparable to established government 
cash assistance programs such as Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) or the 
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) (French, 2009). In Figure 1 below, we provide 
the proportion of households with incomes above $30,000 by American Indian status. The trend 
prior to the opening of the casino was similar across American Indian and non-Indian households. 
However, there is a sustained upward movement in the proportion of American Indian households 
that earn more than $30,000 per year. No similar change is noted for the non-Indian households 
after the introduction of the casino payments.  
																																																								
4	All adult tribal members received these per capita disbursements. The average annual amount per person has been 
approximately $4000. If there were any non-compliers (American Indian parents that either did not receive or refused 
the additional income) then any estimates found here would be an under estimate of the true effects of additional 
income. All enrolled, American Indian children were eligible for the casino disbursements themselves at age 18 if they 
completed high school; even if they did not complete high school they would receive the casino transfers at age 21.	
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Figure 1: Percent of households with annual income greater than $30,000 by ethnicity
 
 
 As Figure 1 indicates, there was a sharp increase in the proportion of AI households 
reporting annual incomes in excess of $30,000 that started in the first year of casino operations. The 
steady increase in household income can be attributed to the fact that the casino payment was 
increasing over time due to increasing casino revenues. On average, the size of the casino payment 
was about $4,000 per year per tribal member. In the table below, we regress the household income 
on whether the household receives the casino transfer payment. The coefficient at 0.79 indicates 
that the average amount of the change in overall income due to the casino payment over the time 
period was approximately $3,965 (note that income is measured in bins which are $5,000 in size). 
The size of the per-capita transfer is non-trivial in absolute and relative terms. The average income 
of AI households with two adult tribal members in the first four (pre-casino) survey waves was 
$22,145, so the casino transfers increased household income by almost 20% for these households. 
Note that the cash transfers are disbursed to adult members of the tribes only, children’s cash 
transfers are banked for them until age 18 so the family receives no money for the children during 
our study period.  
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  (1) 
VARIABLES Household Income in $5000 bins 
    
Casino Payment?  0.793*** 
(0.275) 
Number of Children Less than 6 years old in Household 
0.103 
(0.107) 
Constant 5.635*** 
(0.0940) 
Observations 2,386 
R-squared 0.213 
Household FEs Y 
Number of gsms 504 
Note: American Indian-specific linear time trend, Survey Wave (calendar year) Fixed Effects and Standard errors 
clustered at the individual level provided in parentheses.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
  In the Great Smoky Mountains Study of Youth there are a number of questions asked 
repeatedly at all survey waves regarding the adolescents’ personality and behaviors. Parents and 
children are surveyed separately up until age 16, subsequently the survey subject is interviewed 
alone at ages 19 onward. Survey questions were specifically designed to diagnose behavioral 
emotional disorders. Questions on the survey align with standard definitions for diagnoses and 
disorders from the DSM-IV.  
 The GSMS is specifically created to assess mental health and well-being in children.5 The 
questions are designed to identify psychiatric, behavioral, and emotional disorders. We use the 
count of behavioral and emotional disorders as identified in the survey as outcome variables. 
Behavioral disorders are defined as anxiety or depression diagnosis from the “Any Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (Fourth Edition) (DSM-IV)”. The emotional disorder 
variable is coded as any DSM-IV conduct, oppositional, or antisocial personality disorder. These 
variables are constructed based on two sets of survey questions - parents’ reported observed 
behavior of their children and children’s responses to direct questions from the interviewers. The 
indicators for emotional and behavioral disorders are constructed based on the union of the answers 
given by parents and children - i.e. if either respondent’s answer indicates a symptom, that 
symptom is considered present. A larger value indicates greater or more frequent instances of the 
																																																								
5	Appendix Table 13 provides initial psychiatric disorders in the first survey wave. The table is replicated from Costello 
et al (1997).	
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outcome variable (higher probability of psychiatric diagnosis, more behavioral problems, more 
emotional problems). These variables have been standardized with mean zero and unit standard 
deviation across all individuals by age. We provide the summary statistics for the variables for the 
first survey wave aggregated across all age cohorts by race in Table 2 below; due to this the mean 
and standard deviations are not exactly 0 and 1. 
 For comparability with existing studies on personality traits, we take advantage of the rich 
information gathered in the interviews. We use several questions contained in the GSMS data that 
align with the Big Five Measures of Personality. Three dimensions of the Big Five are well-suited 
to the GSMS survey questions. They are: 1) Conscientiousness -- Tendency to be organized, 
responsible and hardworking. 2) Agreeableness -- Tendency to act in a cooperative and unselfish 
manner. 3) Neuroticism -- Chronic level of emotional instability and prone to psychological 
distress. 
 Using data from the GSMS survey questionnaires, we found comparable questions which 
are similar to those used in the determination of these three personality traits.6  For these sets of 
questions we only use answers from the parents. The full set of survey questions that were used to 
determine the three sub-parts of the Big 5 Personality traits are listed in Appendix Table A1. We re-
coded the personality trait measures such that a higher score indicates a movement in favor of the 
Big 5 personality trait (more conscientious, more agreeable, more neurotic). Thus, an improvement 
in personality traits would be reflected in an increase of the measured level of the trait, while a 
deterioration in personality traits will be reflected in a decrease in the measured level of the trait. 
This holds for conscientiousness and agreeableness; however, excessive increases in neuroticism 
can actually be classified as a pathology and a large increase in this trait is not necessarily a 
beneficial outcome. Given that there were often multiple variables that could be used to identify 
these different personality traits, we used a weighted average of the multiple survey variables to 
create a single index variable. Our weighted average is based on principal component analysis. The 
variable responsible for the largest amount of variance in the data is given a higher weighting. The 
linear combination is then used to provide a predicted value that becomes the index variable.  
  The GSMS survey contains a set of questions that help us construct additional variables 
																																																								
6	It was difficult to identify questions which relate to the other two dimensions of personality traits (Extraversion and 
Openness). 
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measuring the quality of parental relationships and parental behaviors. These variables are 
measured in categories and increasing values indicate either better outcomes or relationships. Only 
one parent (the primary caregiver) is asked about the quality of the relationship between the parents. 
The child is asked whether they enjoy time spent with their mothers. The number of arguments with 
children question is asked of the primary caregiver only and is a count variable for the past three 
months. The data includes information regarding parental supervision and relationships with their 
spouses and children. We describe these variables in Table 2 below.   
  
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of important outcome and control variables 
American Indian Non-Indian 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Number of Children Less than 6 years of age 0.498 0.787  0.287 0.862 
Average Household Income in First Three Survey Waves by 
Category* 
4.429 2.857  7.092 5.350 
Biological Parents Married?  0.431 0.497 0.570 0.743 
Behavioral Disorders** -0.210 0.674 -0.203 0.820 
Emotional Disorders** -0.237 0.820 -0.015 1.297 
Conscientiousness*** 0.215 0.969 0.082 1.390 
Agreeableness*** 0.038 1.343 -0.165 1.606 
Neurotic*** 0.156 1.060 -0.118 1.717 
Adequate Supervision of Mother**** 1.971 0.227 1.973 0.271 
Enjoyable Activities with mother**** 1.866 0.541 1.901 0.518 
Full Time Employed Mother 0.582 0.541 0.586 0.792 
Poor relationship between parents? 0.344 0.488 0.435 0.791 
Arguments with Parents 4.691 23.213   6.401 27.506 
Note: There are 1029 observations of Non-Indians in the data and 327 of American Indians in the first survey wave. 
Means and Standard Deviations are weighted using sample probability weights. 
*in  $5000  bins 
** Standardized by age across all races. We present only the aggregate results for all age 
cohorts by race for the first survey wave in this table. *** Predicted values from principal 
component analysis. 
**** On a scale of 0 to 2, higher values indicates more supervision or enjoyable activities. 
 
A study of baseline characteristics measured in the first wave of the survey found no significant 
differences in mental health problems between the American Indian and white children (Costello et 
al, 1997). The authors also report that the prevalence of psychiatric disorders in the survey 
population at baseline was in line with what was found in other epidemiological studies of 
similarly-aged children in the United States.  
  
IV. Conceptual Framework 
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The main question of interest in this study is whether and to what extent the receipt of 
exogenous unearned household income affects children’s emotional wellbeing and behavioral 
health. While the existing theoretical and empirical literature has studied extensively how policy 
interventions such as Head Start, Project STAR or the Perry Preschool experiment affect children’s 
short- and long-term outcomes, there is relatively little prior empirical evidence on the effects of 
shocks to household financial wellbeing unrelated to changes in parental employment. Our 
conceptual framework is most closely related to Becker and Tomes (1979), Heckman and Cunha 
(2008) and Aizer and Cunha (2012).  
 In these models, even with some distaste for skill inequality the family may invest more in 
children with higher levels of human capital. This is because the return on investment in these 
children is higher and because parents expect or can otherwise devise mechanisms that induce 
higher-endowment children to share at least some of their future resources with their less-endowed 
siblings. Families may tolerate some amount of skill inequality if it means that the average payoff 
to investments in skill level will be higher due to high returns from more gifted children.  
 The predictions from these models are that, all else equal, changes in children’s human 
capital endowments brought about by external educational interventions will improve educational 
outcomes the most for those with higher initial endowments. Thus, a relative reduction in the cost 
of investing in children’s human capital will lead to the reinforcement of inequality within a 
household. Further, these models predict that in equilibrium, families that received a better initial 
draw of human capital endowment for their children will invest more in these children’s human 
capital than families who received a bad initial draw from the distribution of initial children’s 
endowments.  
 Our framework differs from this setup because we examine the effects of a permanent 
increase in household unearned income, rather than exogenous changes in (returns to) child 
endowments. The standard models cited above predict that this pure income effect would improve 
parental investments in all children regardless of their initial human capital endowments, as long as 
children are normal goods.  In Appendix Figure 1 we provide the initial distribution of two of our 
outcome measures by initial household income. The results indicate that conscientiousness varies 
positively with initial household income for both American Indian and non-Indian children. 
Emotional disorders vary inversely with initial household income levels prior to the casino 
intervention. Both of these results indicate that income has a direct relationship with both types of 
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measures for American Indians and non-Indians prior to the casino operations. The GSMS surveyed 
only one child per family, which precludes us from analyzing within-family responses to the 
permanent income shock. However, we can still evaluate how this tribal policy affected inequality 
at the community level, among children with different initial endowments. Our results are, 
therefore, informative as to how a change in household income may affect the overall inequality 
levels of child personality traits and endowments. 
 Based on these models it is quite straight forward to predict that emotional and personality-
related human capital production is (weakly) increasing in parental investment and exhibits 
decreasing marginal returns to parental inputs. Therefore, similarly-sized changes in household 
income would predict largest increases in overall skills for those who are at the initially lowest 
levels of skills. Since household income has increased a similar amount for all individuals (it is a 
per capita payment), assuming a positive relationship between unearned income and parental 
investment, an equal-sized increase in income will result in a larger positive change to human 
capital for individuals who start from initially lower levels of skill investment. If in equilibrium 
parents rationally invest less in less endowed children, then even among parents with the same 
initial income levels we would see lower levels of initial investment and thus stronger treatment 
responses to the income intervention among less endowed children. The prediction would be that 
the personality trait production function is weakly concave with respect to income. We take these 
predictions to the data by using the initial levels of child abilities and personality traits in the years 
prior to the casino operations and payments.  
 We maintain that the observed effect is being driven primarily via the change in unearned 
income due to the payments from the casino revenues. Other possibilities such as change in parental 
employment or endogenous marriage do not appear to be important confounding factors. Appendix 
Tables A2 and A3 provide information on the change in parental employment and marital status as 
a result of the start of casino payments. None of the coefficients in these regressions are large in 
magnitude and they never reach statistical significance at any conventional levels. Additionally, as 
noted in earlier research, other health or educational programs were likely not driving the observed 
results for these cohorts of children (Akee et al, 2010). New programs were developed for the 
American Indian reservation and spending increased dramatically for reservation services. 
However, the large increases in spending occurred in the early 2000 which is after the youngest age 
cohort of children had already turned 16 (Johnson et al, 2011, Table 14). 
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V. Econometric Framework 
 
 We compare outcomes for adolescents who resided in households with extra income 
(youngest and middle age cohorts of American Indian children) to adolescents who were not 
exposed to the extra income by age 16 (the oldest age cohort). The two youngest age cohorts (Age 9 
and Age 11 at survey intake; ages 13 and 15 at first treatment) function as the "after-treatment" 
cases and the oldest age cohort (Age 13 at survey intake) is the "before-treatment" case. We focus 
on the effect of the income transfer on personality traits and mental health at age 16.  Therefore, the 
older age cohort of American Indians serves as one control group and non-tribal members serve as 
an additional control group.   
 We examine the effect of changes in unearned income on the outcome variables at all survey 
waves using an individual panel fixed-effects regression. We use all available data for each 
individual from ages 9 (11 and 13 respectively) onwards, interviewed every year until age 16. The 
empirical specification is: 
Yit i  Xit  *Transferit  t Ageit Ageit Racei it   (1) 
 
Where,  i is the individual fixed effect,   t  is a survey wave fixed-effect, it  is a set of age fixed 
effects, and   is the coefficient on an age by race fixed effect. These fixed effects are necessary to 
control for other possible mechanisms that could affect the observed changes in our outcome 
variables. We are able to use an interaction between age and wave fixed effects as we have 
American Indian and non-Indians from the three different cohorts of children. The age by race fixed 
effects capture any time variant differences in the mental health and personality development 
between the two groups of children. In order to identify the treatment effect, it is necessary that the 
outcome variables follow a common trend prior to the observed intervention. Appendix Figure 2 
provides the pre-casino intervention trends for the five outcome variables for American Indian 
children and Non-Indian children. In most cases, there is a relatively stable relationship between the 
two groups. Importantly, there is no observed differential movement in the trend for one group or 
the other in these figures.   
 The variable X controls for the presence of children younger than six in the household. The 
variable Transfer measures whether the child resides in a household that receives the unearned 
income transfers due to the casino revenues. The variable is always zero for households that do not 
		 17
receive the casino transfers.  For households that do receive the casino transfers, the variable is zero 
for the first four survey waves and then increases to one for all years thereafter. We cluster standard 
errors for the individual fixed-effects panel regressions at the individual level (Stock and Watson, 
2008).   
 Our analysis examines differences in individual changes between the youngest and oldest 
cohorts of children across American Indians and non-Indians in the data set. In the figures below, 
we provide some evidence of the change in emotional disorders and agreeableness by American 
Indian ethnicity and by age cohort. In Panel A of Figure 2, we difference the level of emotional 
disorders for the same individual at ages 12 and 16. Then we plot the distribution of these 
individual differences by age cohort and American Indian status. We have demeaned the results by 
the average cohort change for each age cohort for both panels. In the first plot the results indicate 
that, without controlling for other covariates, the youngest age cohort of American Indian children 
experienced a leftward shift of their level of emotional disorders relative to the older cohort of 
American Indian children. This represents a decrease in their level of emotional disorders. For non-
Indians, whose distributions are shown in the second plot of the figure, there is leftward shift for a 
portion of the distribution of the youngest age cohort relative to the oldest age cohort of non 
American Indians. Specifically, this provides some evidence that the biggest gains are made for 
those American Indians in the youngest age cohort who start out with the initially highest level of 
emotional disorders.  
 In Panel B, we provide a look at the effect on agreeableness. The results for American 
Indians indicate that the change in agreeableness over time increases for all individuals in the 
youngest age cohort. There is little or no change across the two non-American Indian cohorts over 
time. The rightward shift of the distribution for the youngest cohort of American Indians relative to 
the older cohort indicates that there has been an increase of agreeableness. These results preview 
our findings in the regression tables to follow.  
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Figure 2: Evolution of Emotional Disorders and Agreeableness across ethnicity and age cohorts. 
 
Panel A 
 
 
Panel B 
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VI. Results 
 
 In the table below we provide the results from the panel fixed-effects regressions described 
by equation 2 above. The five outcome variables are: behavioral disorder symptoms, emotional 
disorder symptoms, conscientiousness, agreeableness and neuroticism. The first two columns report 
the estimated effects of the casino transfers on the presence and severity of behavioral disorder 
symptoms observed in the child. The outcome variables are normalized to mean zero and standard 
deviation of one across all individuals by age. If we interpret the coefficients relative only to the 
American Indian population (see Table 2), the coefficients imply a reduction in the number of 
behavioral disorder symptoms by 26.7 percent of a standard deviation. The coefficient on casino 
payment in the second column indicates that the casino payment reduces the incidence of emotional 
disorder symptoms for treated children by 35.6 percent of a standard deviation.  
 The last three columns provide results using personality traits as outcome variables. These 
three personality traits take on both positive and negative values as they have been standardized by 
age to mean zero and unit standard deviation.  The variables have been coded so that positive values 
indicate more of the respective personality traits indicated. The coefficient on casino payment in 
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columns 3 and 4 indicate that the increase in household income has a positive effect on child 
personality traits. The casino payment increases the conscientiousness of treated children by 42.8% 
of a standard deviation while it increases agreeableness by 30.6 % of a standard deviation. There is 
a positive effect on neuroticism, however, it is not statistically significant.7 
  
Table 3: The effect of casino transfers on children’s emotional and behavioral traits and disorders 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES 
Behavioral 
Disorder 
Symptoms 
Emotional 
Disorder 
Symptoms Conscientiousness Agreeableness Neuroticism 
            
Casino Payment? -0.180* -0.292** 0.304** 0.412** 0.267 
(0.109) (0.137) (0.144) (0.178) (0.207) 
Number of Children < 6  
Years in Household 
0.0554 0.0275 -0.0655 -0.0204 -0.121* 
(0.0338) (0.0353) (0.0430) (0.0404) (0.0635) 
Constant 0.0446 0.179** -0.462*** -0.776*** -0.749*** 
(0.0657) (0.0695) (0.0853) (0.102) (0.119) 
Child fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 6,050 6,050 5,893 5,695 5,880 
R-squared 0.019 0.019 0.045 0.077 0.052 
Number of gsms 1,405 1,405 1,402 1,396 1,400 
Note: American Indian Trend and Age Fixed Effects. Standard errors clustered at the individual level provided 
in parentheses. ; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
We next test for potential heterogeneities in these effects across children with different initial (pre-
transfer) endowments. The coefficients on the interaction variables of the casino transfer dummy 
with initial levels of the measured outcomes indicate whether there were any differential effects of 
extra income across different children. The results suggest that the casino payments had the largest 
effects for those individuals who start off with the lowest initial endowments. Our empirical results 
align with the prediction that the personality traits production function is concave with respect to 
family income.  
 
Table 4: Heterogeneous effects of casino transfer by initial conditions of the child 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES 
Behavioral 
Disorder 
Symptoms 
Emotional 
Disorder 
Symptoms Conscientiousness Agreeableness Neuroticism 
            
Casino Payment? -0.223* -0.349** 0.415** 0.517*** 0.432** 
																																																								
7	A placebo regression which restricts the observations to the four survey waves prior to the casino operations and 
artificially treats the first two cohorts of American Indian children is provided in Appendix Table A4. The results 
indicate that there is little to no evidence of the effects found in Table 3 in this placebo test.  
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(0.131) (0.152) (0.163) (0.199) (0.215) 
Interaction of Pre-Casino 
Behavioral Disorder Symptoms 
Average x Casino Payment 
-0.197 
(0.235) 
Interaction of Pre-Casino 
Emotional Disorder Symptoms 
Average x Casino Payment 
-0.270 
(0.172) 
Interaction of Pre-Casino 
Conscientiousness Average x 
Casino Payment 
-0.350** 
(0.149) 
Interaction of Pre-Casino 
Agreeableness Average x Casino 
Payment 
-0.351** 
(0.148) 
Interaction of Pre-Casino 
Neuroticism Average x Casino 
Payment 
-0.631*** 
(0.143) 
Number of Children Less than 6 
years old in Household 
0.0546 0.0261 -0.0619 -0.0218 -0.113* 
(0.0334) (0.0352) (0.0422) (0.0397) (0.0636) 
Constant 0.0421 0.177** -0.466*** -0.776*** -0.752*** 
(0.0656) (0.0695) (0.0852) (0.102) (0.120) 
Child fixed effect Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 6,050 6,050 5,886 5,692 5,879 
R-squared 0.021 0.021 0.048 0.080 0.054 
Number of gsms 1,405 1,405 1,399 1,394 1,399 
Note: American Indian Age Trend and Age Fixed Effects. Standard errors clustered at the individual 
level provided in parentheses.; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
In interpreting the interaction coefficients it is important to remember that the standardized 
measures of personality traits take both positive and negative values and are standardized with 
mean zero. Thus, a negative interaction coefficient coupled with a negative initial value implies a 
positive overall effect of the treatment. In columns 1 and 2, individuals with initially higher levels 
of behavioral or emotional symptoms are most likely to experience a reduction in their symptoms 
after the start of casino payments. The estimated coefficients are negative but not statistically 
significant in either column. In comparison, the interaction coefficients of initial levels of 
behavioral traits with casino payments are negative and statistically significant in all cases.  
 The next three columns provide the corresponding results for the Big 5 Personality Traits. 
The measures of personality traits range in value from negative to positive values with higher 
values indicating higher levels of that particular personality trait. As a result, individuals with 
initially low levels of conscientiousness will have negative values which, combined with a negative 
interaction term coefficient, imply a positive overall effect on the outcome measure due to the 
casino transfer. For instance, the total effect of casino payments for an individual who starts off 
with a level of conscientiousness of -0.10 is an increase of 0.415 + -0.10 x -0.35 = 0.415+0.035= 
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0.45 in conscientiousness, which is approximately an increase of 46% of a standard deviation. The 
same reasoning holds for the last two columns. Another way to interpret these results is that the 
extra cash transfers improve emotional and behavioral health for all children, however the 
improvements are much more pronounced for those who had pre-treatment values below the mean 
of the estimated outcome. In Appendix Table A5 we present the estimates from models comparing 
transfer effects across individuals - excluding individual fixed effects and including initial levels of 
outcome variables (averages of the outcome variable taken over the first three survey waves) and 
their interaction with the casino payment. Unsurprisingly, the initial levels are highly predictive of 
the outcomes at age 16. The important take-away from this exercise is that the interaction terms are 
similar in magnitude and have the same signs as the estimates in the regressions including person 
fixed effects. This reassures us that the observed results can be attributed to the heterogeneous 
effect of casino payments; there is no evidence for a “regression to the mean” result. 
 Previous research has found that parents invest resources in children with the highest initial 
endowments. The reason is that the returns to parental investment are highest in these cases. Our 
results do not necessarily contradict those results as the intervention here does not alter child 
endowments, but instead relaxes the parent’s budget constraint. Further, we do not observe more 
than one child per household so we cannot draw conclusions on the intra-household distribution of 
resources as a function of initial child endowments. Our findings are particularly helpful if we are 
interested in the effect of transfer payments on community-level inequality in adolescent 
personality traits and behaviors.  
 
VII. Mechanisms 
 
 The overall effect of an increase in unearned household income is an improvement in child 
personality traits by age 16. The results also indicate that there is a reduction in behavioral and 
emotional disorders. In this section, we explore several channels through which the increase in 
unearned income may affect child outcomes.8  
A. Parental Behaviors 
																																																								
8	Our data do not contain information on consumption or expenditures, therefore it is not possible to examine whether 
the unearned income was spent on additional educational inputs. Jones et al (2015) have found some evidence in 
Canada that increased incomes affect child outcomes via both increased expenditures and on an improvement in 
parental and household behaviors.	
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We first investigate the effect of changes in household income on parental behaviors and 
relationships as a potential mechanism that may contribute to improved child wellbeing. 
Increasingly, there is convincing evidence that parents’ mental and physical health are affected by 
changes in household income (Milligan and Stabile, 2011; Jones et al, 2015). For example, Evans 
and Garthwaite, (2014) find that there is a statistically significant reduction in maternal stress levels 
and stress-related hormones in households where mothers qualify for more generous EITC. In 
related research, Mani et al (2013) find that individuals with lower stress have better overall 
cognitive functioning. Paxson and Walfogel (2002) show that there is a strong relationship between 
poverty and child maltreatment. In the psychology literature, there is mounting evidence for the 
Family Stress model which posits that economic hardships lead to increased emotional distress and 
ultimately marital strife (Conger et al, 1999). In other work, authors have found that the resulting 
marital stress (due to economic hardship) has led to poorer parenting and more difficulty in 
adolescent boys’ emotional development (Conger et al, 1992). Examining only African-American 
families, Conger et al (2002) find that there is a reduction in good parenting behaviors at the onset 
of economic hardships which also play a role in measures of child adjustment.  
 The change in parental behaviors and relationships triggered by income transfers may be 
one of the mechanisms through which increased household income affects children. Table 5 
provides results examining four variables that capture parental relationships contained in the GSMS 
data set. In column 1, there is evidence that the casino payment increases the level of parental 
supervision of their child (as reported by the parent). The magnitude of the coefficient is 
approximately 50% of a standard deviation of the observed variable for American Indians (see 
Table 2). The effect of the casino payment on whether the child has an enjoyable relationship with 
the parent (as reported by the child) is approximately 39.7% of a standard deviation for American 
Indians. Overall the effect of having additional household income is that there is an improvement in 
parental supervision of their children and relationships with their children (columns 1 and 2). Of 
note, these two outcomes are reported by separate respondents so that we can conclude that the 
estimated effects are not just a result of improved general outlook on life among parents receiving 
the transfers. We have previously noted these findings in earlier research and they are repeated here 
for completeness (Akee et al 2010).  
 In column 3, we test whether the relationships between parents improve as a result of the 
transfers. The increase in income due to the casino payment decreases the likelihood that a parent 
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characterizes their relationship with their spouse or partner as poor. The coefficient on the casino 
payment variable is approximately 25.2% of a standard deviation of the average in the first three 
survey waves for American Indians. The fourth column indicates that there has been a reduction in 
the number of arguments with parents after the casino payments began. The coefficient on this 
variable is 32.7% of a standard deviation of the arguments with parent variable for American 
Indians. Overall, we find convincing evidence that the casino transfers resulted in a large 
improvement in parental relationships with children and with spouses.   
 
Table 5: Effects of casino transfer on Parental Behaviors and Relationships 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 
Adequate 
Parental 
Supervision? 
Enjoyable 
Relationship 
with Parent? 
Poor relationship 
between parents? 
Arguments with 
Parent 
          
Casino Payment? 0.104** 0.158** -0.120* -7.591*** 
(0.0516) (0.0787) (0.0676) (2.819) 
Number of Children Less than 6 years 
old in Household 
-0.00585 -0.0202 9.61e-05 0.479 
(0.00965) (0.0137) (0.0159) (0.803) 
Constant 1.970*** 1.865*** 0.548*** 10.68*** 
(0.0225) (0.0300) (0.0331) (1.494) 
Individual child FE Y Y Y Y 
Observations 5,015 5,413 5,584 6,038 
R-squared 0.013 0.008 0.035 0.010 
Number of gsms 1,265 1,327 1,389 1,405 
Note: American Indian Trend and Age Fixed Effects. Standard errors clustered at the individual level provided in 
parentheses.. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
  
In order to further investigate the channel through which additional household income affects 
children we include an additional interaction variable into the regressions. In Table 6 below we 
provide the coefficients from separate regressions corresponding to the models in Table 5, where 
we include the casino payment variable and an interaction variable with the casino payment and the 
initial levels of the child’s conscientiousness, agreeableness, behavioral disorder symptoms or 
emotional disorder symptoms.   
 In panel A, the coefficient on the interaction variable indicates that parents will increase 
their supervision for children with worse pre-transfer behavioral health. The number of parent-child 
arguments also decreases more for children with worse initial behavioral symptoms. There appears 
		 25
to be no statistical relationship between these interactions and the other two outcome variables and 
the magnitudes are quite small relative to the coefficient on casino payment alone.  
 In panel B, we find again that the quality of the parent-child relationship improves more 
among families with children who exhibit worse initial emotional disorder symptoms. Here we also 
find that the relationship between the two parents improves more for families with children who 
display worse emotional conditions pre-intervention. In panels C, D and E we show similar 
differences in effects by initial levels of conscientiousness, agreeableness and neuroticism. Parental 
supervision increases more for children who have the lowest initial values of these personality traits 
(coded as negative initial endowments); the relationship between parents and these children 
improve; and the number of reported parent-child arguments decreases.   
 The overall take-away is that parents who receive the extra unearned income due to the 
casino transfers provide investments in their children who have lower than average personality 
traits and higher than average amounts of behavioral and emotional disorders.  
 
Table 6: Heterogeneous effects of income transfers on parental behaviors by initial level of 
children’s endowments 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 
Adequate 
Parental 
Supervision? 
Enjoyable 
Relationship 
with Parent? 
Poor 
relationship 
between 
parents? 
Arguments 
with Parent 
Panel A     
Casino Payment 0.122** 0.156* -0.126* -8.861*** 
(0.0538) (0.0805) (0.0693) (2.868) 
Initial Behavioral Diagnosis x Casino Payment 0.0809** -0.00845 -0.0276 -5.710** 
  (0.0360) (0.0434) (0.0505) (2.270) 
Panel B 
Casino Payment 0.108** 0.174** -0.144** -7.757*** 
(0.0547) (0.0800) (0.0682) (2.836) 
Initial Emotional Diagnosis x Casino Payment 0.0188 0.0731** -0.104** -0.790 
  (0.0510) (0.0361) (0.0434) (1.094) 
Panel C 
Casino Payment 0.125** 0.150* -0.137** -8.188*** 
(0.0544) (0.0806) (0.0697) (2.923) 
Initial Conscientiousness x Casino Payment -0.0588** 0.0254 0.0549 1.970 
  (0.0289) (0.0347) (0.0482) (1.489) 
Panel D 
Casino Payment 0.119** 0.165** -0.129* -8.863*** 
(0.0537) (0.0794) (0.0696) (2.862) 
Initial Agreeableness x Casino Payment -0.0610** -0.0239 0.0392 4.663*** 
  (0.0265) (0.0220) (0.0390) (1.216) 
Panel E 
Casino Payment 0.112** 0.151* -0.137** -8.032*** 
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(0.0545) (0.0804) (0.0680) (2.828) 
Initial Neuroticism x Casino Payment -0.0299 0.0287 0.0699 1.756 
  (0.0346) (0.0395) (0.0498) (1.169) 
Note: Pairs of coefficients are from separate regressions in  each column. All regressions include age fixed effects, 
wave fixed effects, age by race fixed effects and individual fixed effects, number of children less than 6 in the 
household and a constant. Standard errors clustered at the individual level provided in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
B. Parental Drug and Alcohol Abuse and Own Mental Health Outcomes. 
 
 Parents may also change their behavior with regard to their use of drugs and alcohol. 
Reduction in this usage could be taken as a sign of improved decision-making and self-control. In 
the following table, we show regression results from linear probability models where regress 
whether either of the two parents currently use drug and alcohol in the same individual panel 
model. These measures are reported by the respondent parent and the child respectively. In Table 7 
below, the coefficient on casino payment is negative for the parent’s own reporting of drug or 
alcohol use and slightly positive for the child’s reporting. However, neither estimated coefficient is 
statistically significant. The next two regressions provide the drug or alcohol use for parent 2 as 
reported by parent 1 or the child. The estimated coefficient on casino payment is negative in both 
cases and it is statistically significant for the report by parent 1 in column 3. These reported 
reductions in parental drug and alcohol use provide a further indication of an improvement in 
parental behaviors. In previous research (Akee et al, 2010), we have also shown that parents are less 
likely to be arrested after they start receiving the casino payments.  
 
Table 7: Individual Fixed Effects Regression for Parental Alcohol and Drug Use on Casino Payments 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 
Parent 1 Currently 
Uses Alcohol or 
Drugs by Parent 1 
Parent 1 Currently 
Uses Alcohol or 
Drugs by Child 
Parent 2 Currently 
Uses Alcohol or 
Drugs by Parent 1 
Parent 2 Currently 
Uses Alcohol or 
Drugs by Child 
          
Casino Payment? -0.0108 0.0196 -0.0918** -0.0435 
(0.0230) (0.0272) (0.0376) (0.0341) 
Constant 0.0287** 0.0363** 0.163*** 0.146*** 
(0.0117) (0.0158) (0.0248) (0.0237) 
Observations 6,047 5,796 6,043 5,793 
R-squared 0.006 0.005 0.009 0.012 
Number of gsms 1,405 1,395 1,405 1,395 
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Note: American Indian Trend and Age Fixed Effect and Number of Kids Less than 6 Years old and standard errors 
clustered at the individual level provided in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
 
In the next table we examine a proxy for the parent’s own mental health: an indicator of whether the 
parent ever sought treatment by a mental health professional. The variable is reported by the 
respondent parent which is typically the mother in the household. The results in Table 8 indicate 
that receiving casino payments has a negative effect on either parents seeking treatment by a mental 
health professional. The coefficient is negative in both cases and statistically significant for the 
second parent which is typically the father. Of course, the results here only indicate that after the 
casino payments, parents were less likely to report having to seek mental health treatment. This 
may mean that parents experienced less mental health problems or that they simply avoided 
treatment more systematically. It is not possible to distinguish between the two possibilities.  
 
Table 8: Individual Fixed Effects Regression for Parental Mental Health on Casino Payments 
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES 
Ever Treated by Mental Health 
Professional, Parent 1? 
Ever Treated by Mental Health 
Professional, Parent 2? 
      
Casino Payment? -0.109 -0.138*** 
  (0.0793) (0.0527) 
Constant 0.650*** 0.192*** 
  (0.0485) (0.0305) 
      
Observations 6,045 6,044 
R-squared 0.063 0.016 
Number of gsms 1,405 1,405 
Note: American Indian Trend and Age Fixed Effect and Number of Kids Less than 6 years old; standard errors 
clustered at the individual level provided in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
 
C. Movements across Census Tracts 
 As an additional check on potential mechanisms, we examine whether and where individual 
households move following the change in household income. In Table 9 we use information on the 
census tract location of the individual households at various survey waves to investigate whether 
the casino payment increases the likelihood of moving to a different neighborhood. The first 
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column indicates that there is a positive effect of the casino payment on the probability of moving 
of about 7%. In column 2, we include an interaction effect between receiving the casino payment 
and living initially on the reservation. The level effect of the casino payment is still positive and 
statistically significant, however, the coefficient on the interaction variable is now negative. This 
indicates that those residing on the reservation are less likely to leave the reservation after the 
casino payments begin. Therefore, the observed increase in moves must be due to those receiving 
casino payments who reside off of the reservation.  
 We investigate this in the next two columns. Receiving the casino payments in column 3 has 
a small and statistically insignificant negative effect on living on the reservation. However, in 
column 4 we find that, once we include the interaction variable of casino revenue with initially 
living on the reservation, those living on the reservation are more likely to still be living on the 
reservation after the casino payments. The residual difference and any actual movements are due to 
those residing off of the reservation. There is little evidence that those residing off the reservation 
are moving to live on the reservation.  
 
Table 9: Census Tract Changes Regressed on Casino Payments 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 
Change 
Census Tract 
of Residence 
(Coded 
either 0 or 1) 
Change 
Census Tract 
of Residence 
(Coded 
either 0 or 1) 
Living on 
Reservation 
Living on 
Reservation 
          
Casino Payment? 0.0726* 0.146** -0.0216 -0.137** 
(0.0430) (0.0592) (0.0209) (0.0565) 
Casino x Living 
Initially on 
Reservation 
-0.104** 0.157*** 
(0.0516)  (0.0576) 
Number of Children 
Less than 6 years old 
in Household 
0.0107 0.0116 0.00348 0.00281 
(0.0134) (0.0134) (0.00397) (0.00400) 
Constant -0.0827*** -0.0525*** 0.197*** 0.198*** 
(0.0231) (0.0202) (0.00711) (0.00676) 
Observations 5,139 5,101 5,101 5,101 
R-squared 0.059 0.060 0.010 0.043 
Number of gsms 1,389 1,383 1,383 1,383 
Note: American Indian Trend and Age Fixed Effects and Robust Standard errors in 
parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 The next set of regressions in Table 10 investigates the characteristics of the census tracts 
that the individual households move to as a result of the casino payments. All characteristics are 
measured in the 1990 Census data, measured before the casino transfers commenced, so that 
movements across census tracts by transfer recipients are not affecting the tract characteristics. The 
first four columns use the entire GSMS population (both American Indian and non-Indian 
observations). The final four columns report the results from a similar analysis on the American 
Indian population subset alone. In the first set of four regressions, the results suggest that casino 
payments do not have a statistically significant effect on where individuals move to as a result of 
the casino payments. The coefficients are relatively small in magnitude and are never statistically 
significant. 
 Restricting analysis to the American Indian subset, however, provides different results. We 
are exploiting the differences in the survey waves across the different age cohorts of American 
Indian children in these regressions. Results should be interpreted with this caveat in mind. In 
column 5, the coefficient on casino payment indicates that among American Indians who move, 
they move to census tracts that have higher median household incomes. The coefficient on casino 
payment is large and positive for the percent in the labor force but not statistically significant. In the 
next column the coefficient on casino payments is large and barely misses statistical significance at 
the 10% level. Taken together, these results qualitatively indicate that those American Indians who 
are moving as a result of the casino payment are moving to census tracts that have higher levels of 
educational attainment than those census tracts that they were initially located in. Column 8 
indicates that among American Indians who move as a result of the casino payment they are 
moving to census tracts with lower concentration of American Indian heads of households than in 
the neighborhoods where they were located previously. Jacob et al (2014) find that few people 
move out of their communities as a result of the Chicago housing voucher program; our results 
suggest that this holds for the on-reservation population but not for the off-reservation population. 
These findings suggest that part of the observed effects may operate through better neighborhoods, 
at least for the tribal members initially residing off the reservation. This is in line with results from 
other studies investigating the effects of residential mobility on children’s outcomes. The research 
on Moving to Opportunity (Kling et al, 2007), found a statistically significant effect of the 
relocation to better neighborhoods on maternal mental health outcomes. Black (1999) has shown 
that parents are willing to pay a premium to live in school districts which produce higher test 
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scores.  Chetty and Hendren (2015) have found that there is a direct relationship between the 
amount of time a child resides in a better county in the US (due to family moves) and 
intergenerational mobility of those children as adults. 
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Table 10: Census Tract Changes Regressed on Casino Payments for American Indians Alone 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES 
Median 
Family 
Income by 
Census 
Tract 
Percent in 
Labor 
Force by 
Census 
Tract 
Percent 
with High 
School 
Plus 
Percent AI 
Head of 
Household 
by Tract 
Median 
Family 
Income by 
Census 
Tract 
Percent in 
Labor 
Force by 
Census 
Tract 
Percent 
with High 
School 
Plus 
Percent AI 
Head of 
Household 
by Tract 
            
Casino Payment? -321.6 0.0847 -0.162 -0.901 2,086* 0.625 1.223 -6.587* 
(682.9) (0.306) (0.432) (1.656) (1,182) (0.614) (0.777) (3.878) 
Number of Children 
Less than 6 years old in 
Household 
-51.50 -0.0396 -0.0539 0.688* -121.4 0.0167 0.0779 1.419* 
(195.2) 
(0.1000) 
(0.154) (0.370) 
 
(152.3) (0.103) (0.127) (0.749) 
Constant 49,561*** 60.49*** 68.52*** 13.53*** 34,522*** 59.19*** 63.17*** 61.14*** 
(535.7) (0.224) (0.361) (0.559) (1,812) (1.277) (1.524) (7.551) 
American Indians 
Alone? N N N Y Y Y Y 
Observations 5,139 5,139 5,139 5,139 1,309 1,309 1,309 1,309 
R-squared 0.006 0.004 0.008 0.022 0.018 0.017 0.017 0.037 
Number of gsms 1,389 1,389 1,389 1,389   341 341 341 341 
Note: American Indian Trend and Age Fixed Effects and Robust Standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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D. Community Effects by Census Tract 
 In this section we investigate the potential role of community and peer effects in 
determining improved child outcomes for affected households. Using the geographic location of 
households, we merge in US Census data measures for the percent of household heads in a census 
tract (in 1990 prior to the casino operations) that are American Indian. The purpose of these 
regressions is to investigate an additional mechanism that may explain how the introduction of 
higher per capita income in the community affected child emotional and behavioral outcomes. 
Specifically, if a particular community has a high proportion of American Indians the resulting 
increase in incomes due to casino transfer payments would lift incomes for large proportion of the 
community. As a result, there may be community-level positive externalities which affect child 
outcomes in addition to any family-specific processes that contribute to child welfare. For example, 
as incomes increase, all households and parents may monitor not only their own children but those 
in their community at large.  
 In Appendix Table A6 we regress the child outcomes on the main set of controls including 
casino payments as provided in Table 3, but we also include an interaction variable of casino 
payments with the percent of household heads that are American Indian in the census tract. The 
interaction coefficient is small and statistically indistinguishable from zero, suggesting that the 
concentration of individuals receiving the casino transfer in the census tract does not have a strong 
additional effect on the child behavioral or personality traits. The coefficients on the main effects of 
casino payments are only slightly changed from our original results presented in Table 3.  
 The next four sets of regressions in Appendix Table A6 use a different interaction variable. 
In these regressions we include the standard set of control variables as well as an interaction 
between casino payments and whether the household resides on the American Indian reservation or 
not. The results from this analysis are similar to that found in the previous four columns – higher 
concentration of American Indian households in the census tract does not lead to disproportionately 
strong effects of the casino transfers. 
 Finally, in Appendix Table A7 we test the hypothesis that a higher concentration of transfer 
recipients in the census tract amplifies that effect of casino transfers on parental and parent-child 
relationships. We regress the parental behavior and relationship outcome variables on the same set 
of regressors and interaction variables. The results largely mirror the results presented in Table 5 
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although there is a slight reduction in statistical significance in some regressions for the coefficient 
on casino payments.  
 Overall, community-wide effects do not appear to be a strong mechanism in explaining the 
observed improvement in either child behavior and personality traits or parental behaviors and 
relationships. Ultimately, this may indicate that the community-wide effects of the additional 
income did not result in positive externalities that can be measured in our data in this relatively 
short time period. 
 
VIII. Robustness Checks and Specification Checks 
 
In this section we explore several potential other confounding factors which may be driving 
the observed results. In previous research (Akee et al 2010, 2013; and Costello et al 2003) we 
examined changes primarily by initial household poverty status. The results indicated in those 
studies that there was significant heterogeneity in program effect across initial household poverty 
status. Child educational attainment was largest for the initially poor households and reductions in 
obesity were largest for the initially wealthier households. Comparing across survey respondents, 
there were larger reductions in child psychopathology for the poorer households. In Table A8 we 
provide the main analysis from Table 3 by initial household poverty status. The results indicate that 
the coefficients are of the expected signs for the first four columns in both panels and attain 
statistical significance in five out of the eight regressions. The coefficient on casino payments for 
the neuroticism regression has a negative sign for households not initially in poverty, but positive 
(as expected) and statistically significant at the 10% level for households initially in poverty. 
Overall, the results show some slight differences, but the results are not as stark as previously found 
in between-household (child) analysis.  
We also examine whether the effect of having a single American Indian parent or two 
American Indian parents have differential effects on the observed outcomes for our main outcome 
variables as presented in Table 3. Households with two American Indian parents will receive twice 
the amount of the per capita disbursements as payments are made to all tribally-enrolled citizens, 
not by household. In Table A9 we separate out whether the household has one American Indian 
parent household or two American Indian parents in the household. It appears that observed effects 
are driven by having at least one American Indian parent in the household. The coefficients on 
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having a second American Indian parents are similar to those of the first American Indian parent 
but are smaller in magnitude and never achieve statistical significance.  
In Table A10 we separate out the behavioral and emotional disorder reports contained in the 
survey as to whether they are by the parent alone, child alone or both combined. In our analysis we 
use the combined reports as is standard in the psychology literature. However, separating out the 
responses by parent and child indicates that the observed results for a reduction in emotional 
disorder symptoms is driven by the child’s reporting.  On the other hand, the reduction in 
behavioral disorders is driven primarily by the parent’s reporting of child behaviors.  
Finally, in Table A11 we present our main regression results for households that are headed 
by a single parent. One potential confounding factor for our analysis is that there might have been 
other changes occurring at the time of the casino operations in 1996. One dramatic change was the 
welfare reform that occurred at approximately the same time at the national level. Therefore, in this 
analysis we include an interaction variable which indicates whether a household was headed by a 
single parent (which is a necessary condition to be eligible for welfare). The coefficient on this 
interaction variable is provided in the second row of the table. None of the coefficients attain 
statistical significance and the main results are qualitatively similar to our main results in Table 3.  
The validity of our main results rests on the assumption that there were no unobserved, AI-
specific programs or positive economic shocks that commenced at the same time as the casino 
transfers. One potential source could be an increase in US federal funding for American Indians in 
particular starting in 1996. Examining data from Walke (2000), we find that there has been a sharp 
reduction in federal funding for American Indians across the board since the 1980s and a slight drop 
in 1996 as well. We also checked the US Senate Documents for Bureau of Indian Affairs 
appropriations and found that there were no new funding allocations for the Eastern Band of 
Cherokee Indians during this time period.  
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Source: Walke (2000) 
 
IX. Discussion of Long-Run Outcomes 
 Given the longitudinal nature of our data, we can examine the association between the 
improved personality traits and reduction in emotional and behavioral disorders and that of adult 
outcomes. In the table below, we identify the association between the levels of age 16 disorders and 
personality traits and age 25 outcomes such as employment and educational attainment of non-
Indians. The non-Indians were not affected by changes in unearned income and thus did not have a 
subsequent change in disorders or personality traits. We find that measures of emotional and 
behavioral wellbeing at age 16 are negatively related to labor market outcomes measured at age 25. 
Higher levels of behavioral and emotional disorders are associated with lower levels of educational 
attainment and employment probabilities. Conversely, higher levels of the three personality traits 
(conscientiousness, agreeableness and neuroticism) at age 16 are associated with higher levels of 
these same age 25 outcomes.  
 
Table 11: Association between Long Run Outcomes (Age 25) for Non American Indians using Age 16 Levels 
of Disorders and Personality Traits 
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES   
Years of 
Educational 
Attainment Full Time Employed?  
Panel A     
Behavioral Disorder Symptoms at Age 16 
-0.475*** -0.0734*** 
  (0.0815) (0.0165) 
$2,000	
$3,000	
$4,000	
$5,000	
$6,000	
$7,000	
$8,000	
19
75
19
76
19
77
19
78
19
79
19
80
19
81
19
82
19
83
19
84
19
85
19
86
19
87
19
88
19
89
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
Indian	Per	Capita	Expenditure	in	Constant	1997	dollars	
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Panel B 
Emotional Disorder Symptoms at Age 16 
-0.421*** -0.0421** 
  (0.114) (0.0189) 
Panel C 
Conscientiousness Score at Age 16 0.517*** 0.0481*** 
  (0.0876) (0.0169) 
Panel D 
Agreeableness Score at Age 16 0.263*** 0.0412*** 
    (0.0753) (0.0147) 
Panel E 
Neuroticism Score at Age 16 0.279*** 0.0504*** 
(0.0683) (0.0112) 
Note: Pairs of coefficients are from separate regressions in  each column. All regressions include age fixed 
effects, wave fixed effects, age by race fixed effects and individual fixed effects,  number of children less 
than 6 in the household and a constant. Robust Standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
  We decompose the changes in age 25 educational attainment and full time 
employment due to the associated changes in observed increases (by age 16) in 
conscientiousness and decreases in emotional disorders in the following table. We use the actual 
changes in child personality traits and emotional wellbeing at age 16 and the respective 
correlation coefficients from Table 11 to account for the observed increase in overall 
educational attainment and employment probability at age 25.  
  In Table 12 below, we present some results for the change in conscientiousness and 
emotional disorders (we do not present the other measures as they are highly correlated with 
one another and provide similar results). The total change in educational attainment and fulltime 
employment (differencing across age cohorts and American Indian status) is given in the first 
row of the table as almost half a year of education (0.487 for education) and an increase of 22% 
in fulltime employment (0.224 for full time probability). We compute these measures using a 
simple difference-in-difference equation with no covariates for the age 25 outcome variables -
educational attainment and full time employment probability. The equation is the following: 
 
EducationChange  (EducationY ,AI EducationO,AI ) (EducationY ,NonAI  EducationO,NonAI )  
 
In the equation above the subscripts Y and O indicate youngest and oldest age cohorts 
respectively and AI and NonAI represent American Indian and Non-Indian respectively. The 
four different variables labeled “Education” are the average educational attainment at age 25 for 
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each of the four subgroups. A similar calculation is conducted for full time employment 
probabilities at age 25. 
  In Panel A, we provide the change in conscientiousness for the youngest age cohort 
of American Indians in our data (the second row). The coefficient on the third line comes from 
Table 11 above and the fourth line provides the product of the value in row 2 and 3.  We call 
this the total change in the fourth row. Finally, in the fifth row of Panel A we show the percent 
of the net change this total change represents, which is calculated as the ratio of row four to row 
one. The change in conscientiousness is associated with approximately 28% of the difference in 
educational attainment for this age cohort and about 6% of the difference of fulltime 
employment. Panel B provides a similar calculation for the reduction in emotional disorders and 
it is associated with approximately 21% of the change in educational attainment and about 5% 
of the change in full time employment probability.  
  It is important to note that these measures are not independent (conscientiousness 
and emotional disorders) of one another; these results should not be interpreted as additive here. 
Additionally, it is not possible to fully provide a causal story for these long run (measured at age 
25) outcomes and we stress that the results are meant to illustrate potential long-run effects.  
 
Table 12: Explaining Raw Differences in Outcomes by Changes in Age 16 Characteristics 
    Education 
Fulltime 
Employed 
(1) Net Change at Age 25 (Difference in Difference Estimate) 0.487 0.224 
 
Panel A 
(2) Change in Conscientiousness for Age Cohort 1 AI 0.260 0.260 
(3) Coefficient on Conscientiousness from Non AI (Table 11)  0.517 0.048 
(4) Total Change = row(2) x row(3): 0.134 0.013 
  (5) Percent of difference explained by increase in conscientiousness = row (4) / row (1) 0.276 0.056 
Panel B 
(2) Change in Emotional for Age Cohort 1 AI -0.238 -0.238 
(3) Coefficient on Emotional from Non AI (Table 11) -0.421 -0.042 
(4) Total Change = row(2) x row(3): 0.100 0.010 
  (5) Percent of difference explained by reduction in Emotional = row (4) / row (1) 0.206 0.045 
 
X. Conclusion 
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 Our research investigates the effect of increases in unearned income on personality traits and 
behavioral and emotional disorders of children up to the age of 16. To our knowledge, this research 
is the first to examine an unearned income intervention and its resulting effect on child personality 
traits and behavioral disorders accounting for unobserved fixed individual characteristics in a 
longitudinal setting. It is also the first to examine potential mechanisms using data on parents of the 
population of interest.   
 The results presented here indicate that there are significant positive effects of an increase in 
unearned household income on the prevalence of behavioral and emotional disorders and on the 
personality traits of affected children. These effects are robust to individual fixed-effects and are not 
explained by changes in parental time use, employment, marital status, changes in national welfare 
reform or other tribal government programmatic changes. The size of the effects is relatively large; 
the effect reduces behavioral disorders by 26.7 % of a standard deviation and increases 
conscientiousness by 42.8 % of a standard deviation. We have also shown that the effect is most 
significant for children who were initially behind their peers in these traits and those who exhibited 
more symptoms of disorders. This suggests that parents may be reacting to the exogenous cash 
transfers by compensating for their children who have lower levels of mental health and worse 
personality traits. 
 Given the longitudinal nature of our data we are able to investigate several potential 
mechanisms responsible for the observed change in child outcomes. While there was little to no 
evidence for changes in parental employment (a proxy for time spent with children), there was 
significant evidence to suggest that parental relationships with children and with their spouses 
(partners) improved. Other researchers have shown conclusively that increased incomes have 
significantly improved parental outlook, mental health and happiness. Therefore, the results here 
suggest that while parental time with child may not have changed an improvement in interactions 
alone may have an important impact on child behavior and personality.  
 Finally, we can trace household geographic mobility at the census tract level over time. Our 
results suggest that households that received the casino payments and were initially located off the 
reservation were more likely to move to slightly better (in terms of median household income) 
census tracts. These results suggest that at least some of the improvement in the child behavioral 
and personality traits may be explained by better community amenities present in these higher 
income areas.   
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 One important caveat regarding our research is worth repeating. The increase in unearned 
income is relatively large and has been effectively a permanent change for our study population. 
Other income interventions have been shown to be approximately similar in size but not in duration. 
Additional research for the effect of shorter-term household income changes with a quasi-
experimental design would help to establish the relevant threshold necessary to establish an effect 
on child behavior and personality traits. 
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Table A1: Variables from GSMS Used To Create Big 5 Personality Traits: Agreeableness, Conscientiousness and Neuroticism and Behavioral and Emotional 
            
Agreeableness Emotional   Behavioral 
 
Number of Arguments with Parent1 
(PAD1F01) Sep.distress from home or att.figure Often bullies, threatens, or intimidates others  
 
Number of Arguments with Other 
Adults (PAL1F01) Worry about possible harm Often initiates physical fights  
 
Number of Arguments with Peers at 
School (PBC0F01) Worry about calamitous separation Has used a weapon that can cause serious physical harm to others 
Irritability Intensity (PDA8I01) Persistent reluctance/refusal to go to school Has been physically cruel to people  
Bullies / Extortion (PGF7I01) Avoidance of being alone Has been physically cruel to animals  
 Cruelty to Animals (PGH3V01) Reluctance to sleep away 
Has stolen while confronting a victim (e.g., mugging, purse snatching, extortion, armed 
robbery)  
Rumors (PGH4I01) Separation nightmares Has forced someone into sexual activity  
Spiteful or Vindictive (PGA3I01) Physical symptoms Has deliberately engaged in fire setting with the intention of causing serious damage  
Loses Temper (PGE0I01) Diagnosed panic attacks Has deliberately destroyed others' property (other than by fire setting) 
 Angry or Resentful (PDA7I01) 
Meeting criteria for obsessive 
compulsive disorder Has broken into someone else's house, building, or car  
Social anxiety Often lies to obtain goods or favors or to avoid obligations (i.e., "cons" others)  
Fear public performance Has stolen items of nontrivial value without confronting a victim  
Conscientiousness Social phobia,animal type Often stays out at night despite parental prohibitions, beginning before age 13 years  
 Lying Intensity (PGC3I01) Social phobia,natural,other 
Has run away from home overnight at least twice while living in parental or parental surrog
home  
Impulsive Intensity (PRC3I01) Social phobia,blood,injection,injury Is often truant from school, beginning before age 13 years  
Rule Breaking Intensity (PGA0I01) Agoraphobia Often loses temper  
 
Concentration / Difficulty Paying 
Attention (PCC3I01) 
Post Traumatic Stress Painful recall 
screen positive Often argues with adults  
  
Post Traumatic Stress hyperarousal 
screen positive Often actively defies or refuses to comply with adults' requests or rules  
  
Post Traumatic Stress avoidance screen 
positive Often deliberately annoys people  
Neuroticism Restlessness,Keyed up,on edge Often blames others for his or her mistakes or misbehavior  
Feels unloved (PDC0I01) Easy fatigability Is often touchy or easily annoyed by others  
 
Feeling of Inferiority to others 
(PDC1I01)  Difficulty concentrating, mind blank Is often angry and resentful  
Subject feels sorry for himself Irritability Is often spiteful or vindictive  
		 54
(PDC2I01) 
Feels helpless in general (PDC6I01) Muscle soreness Often fails to give close attention to details or makes careless mistakes 
Depressed Mood (PDA0I01) Trouble falling or staying asleep Often has difficulty sustaining attention in tasks or play activities  
Excessive worry (a symptoms of 
generalized anxiety disorder) Often does not seem to listen when spoken to directly  
Frequent somatic complaints for 
which no physical basis could be 
found  
Often does not follow through on instructions and fails to finish school work, chores 
Excessive need for reassurance Often has difficulty organizing tasks and activities  
Marked feelings of tension or 
inability to relax Often avoids, dislikes, or is reluctant to engage in tasks that require sustained mental effort 
Depressed/irritable mood Often loses things necessary for tasks or activities  
Anhedonia or lose interest Is often easily distracted by extraneous stimuli  
Weight loss or gain/dysthymia Is often forgetful in daily activities  
Insomnia or hypersomnia Often fidgets with hands or feet or squirms in seat  
Psychomotor agitation/retardation Often leaves seat in classroom or in other situations in which remaining seated is expected  
Fatigue or loss of energy Often runs about or climbs excessively in situations in which it is inappropriate  
Low self-esteem/worthlessness/guilt Often has difficulty playing or engaging in leisure activities quietly  
Diff concentrating/thinking/deciding Is often "on the go" or often acts as if "driven by a motor"  
Think about, plan or attempt suicide Often talks excessively 
Hopelessness Often blurts out answers before questions have been completed  
Often has difficulty awaiting turn  
Often interrupts or intrudes on others (e.g., butts into conversations or games)  
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Table A2: Effects of casino transfers on parental marital arrangements 
Parental Marital Status Fixed-Effects Regression 
  (1) 
VARIABLES 
Parents 
currently 
married? 
    
Casino Payment? -0.0290 
(0.0323) 
Number of Children Less than 6 years old in Household 
0.00366 
(0.00792) 
Constant 0.533*** 
(0.0163) 
Observations 6,004 
Number of gsms 1,405 
R-squared 0.047 
Note: American Indian Trend and Age Fixed Effects and Standard errors clustered at the 
individual level provided in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table A3: Casino transfers and parental employment 
Parental Employment Fixed Effects 
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES 
Mother Full 
Time 
Employed? 
Father Full 
Time 
Employed? 
    
Casino Payment? -0.0182 0.0493 
(0.0521) (0.0400) 
Number of Children Less than 6 years old in Household 
-0.0274* -0.00953 
(0.0155) (0.0106) 
Constant 0.532*** 0.924*** 
(0.0302) (0.0223) 
Observations 5,007 3,105 
R-squared 0.022 0.010 
Number of gsms 1,265 814 
Note: American Indian Trend and Age Fixed Effects and Standard errors clustered at the 
individual level provided in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A4: Placebo Test of Casino Payment Prior to Casino Operations (First Four Survey Waves) and 
Cohorts 1 and 2 Treated 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES 
Behavioral 
Disorder 
Symptoms 
Emotional 
Disorder 
Symptoms Conscientiousness Agreeableness Neuroticism 
            
Casino 
Payment? 0.00892 0.219 -0.281* -0.131 -0.252 
(0.106) (0.138) (0.163) (0.163) (0.174) 
Constant 0.147** 0.169** -0.245*** -0.557*** -0.604*** 
(0.0630) (0.0719) (0.0704) (0.102) (0.120) 
Observations 4,607 4,607 4,521 4,335 4,497 
R-squared 0.030 0.024 0.046 0.091 0.062 
Number of 
gsms 1,401 1,401 1,398 1,392 1,396 
Note: American Indian Trend and Age Fixed Effect and Number of Kids Less than 6 Years old and 
Standard errors clustered at the individual level provided in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A5: Regression Analysis without Individual Fixed Effects and Interaction and Level Variables of Initial Child 
Personality Endowment 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES 
Behavioral 
Disorder 
Symptoms 
Emotional 
Disorder 
Symptoms Conscientiousness Agreeableness Neuroticism 
            
Casino Payment?  -0.139 -0.0729 0.155 0.0874 0.0437 
(0.105) (0.120) (0.107) (0.128) (0.137) 
Interaction of Pre-Casino Behavioral 
Disorder Symptoms  x Casino 
-0.241         
(0.199)         
Initial Level Behavioral Disorder 
Symptoms*  
0.841***         
(0.0239)         
Interaction of Pre-Casino Emotional 
Disorder Symptoms x Casino  
  -0.175       
  (0.208)       
Initial Level Emotional Disorder 
Symptoms * 
  0.817***       
  (0.0193)       
Interaction of Pre-Casino 
Conscientiousness x Casino  
    -0.255**     
    (0.123)     
Initial Level Conscientiousness*  
    0.798***     
    (0.0191)     
Interaction of Pre-Casino 
Agreeableness x Casino 
      -0.246*   
      (0.135)   
Initial Level Agreeableness * 
      0.771***   
      (0.0202)   
Interaction of Pre-Casino 
Neuroticism x Casino 
        -0.595*** 
        (0.140) 
Initial Level Neuroticism*  
0.728*** 
(0.0229) 
Constant 0.0638* 0.0912** -0.278*** -0.299*** -0.391*** 
(0.0338) (0.0407) (0.0505) (0.0600) (0.0806) 
Observations 6,050 6,050 5,886 5,692 5,879 
Number of gsms 1,405 1,405 1,399 1,394 1,399 
Note: American Indian Trend and Age Fixed Effects and Standard errors clustered at the individual level 
provided in parentheses. *calculated as the average in the initial 3 (pre-casino) survey waves by subject 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A6: Child Outcomes regressed on Casino and Percent American Indian Household by Census Tract 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES 
Behavioral 
Disorder 
Symptoms 
Emotional 
Disorder 
Symptoms 
Conscientio
usness 
Agreeable
ness 
Neurotici
sm   
Behavioral 
Disorder 
Symptoms 
Emotional 
Disorder 
Symptoms 
Conscient
iousness 
Agreeable
ness Neuroticism 
            
Casino Payment? -0.172 -0.315* 0.284 0.393* 0.471** -0.234* -0.302* 0.366** 0.464** 0.391* 
(0.132) (0.162) (0.184) (0.227) (0.195) (0.122) (0.161) (0.171) (0.209) (0.201) 
Casino x Perecent AI 
Head of Household in 
Census Tract 
-0.00111 0.000704 0.00217 0.00183 -0.00364* 
(0.00137) (0.00164) (0.00202) (0.00239) (0.00208) 
Casino x Residing on 
Reservation 
0.00429 0.0403 0.0276 0.0166 -0.153 
(0.0902) (0.103) (0.126) (0.147) (0.126) 
Number of Children 
Less than 6 years old 
in Household 
0.0623* 0.0277 -0.0792* -0.0349 -0.130* 0.0621* 0.0273 -0.0754* -0.0311 -0.131* 
(0.0331) (0.0374) (0.0442) (0.0412) (0.0678) (0.0331) (0.0373) (0.0442) (0.0414) (0.0679) 
Constant 0.0698 0.140* -0.466*** -0.776*** -0.756*** 0.0770 0.129 
-
0.485*** -0.769*** -0.750*** 
(0.0770) (0.0817) (0.0865) (0.102) (0.121) (0.0774) (0.0819) (0.0860) (0.102) (0.122) 
Observations 5,650 5,650 5,510 5,333 5,497 5,601 5,601 5,464 5,288 5,449 
R-squared 0.022 0.018 0.049 0.078 0.054 0.022 0.017 0.051 0.076 0.053 
Number of gsms 1,289 1,289 1,286 1,281 1,285   1,276 1,276 1,273 1,268 1,272 
Standard errors clustered at the individual level provided in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A7: Parental Behaviors on Casino and Percent Indian Household by Census Tract 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES 
Adequate 
Parental 
Supervision? 
Enjoyable 
Relationship 
with Parent? 
Poor 
relationship 
between 
parents? 
Arguments 
with Parent   
Adequate 
Parental 
Supervision? 
Enjoyable 
Relationship 
with Parent? 
Poor relationship 
between parents? 
Arguments 
with Parent 
          
Casino Payment? 0.0785 0.170** -0.114 -7.836** 0.0727 0.162* -0.100 -10.11*** 
(0.0613) (0.0832) (0.0947) (3.934) (0.0617) (0.0833) (0.0930) (3.110) 
Casino x Perecent AI 
Head of Household in 
Census Tract 
0.000486 -0.000110 -0.000218 -0.0204 
(0.000662) (0.000542) (0.00121) (0.0385) 
Casino x Residing on 
Reservation 
0.0377 0.000971 -0.0344 1.766 
(0.0433) (0.0342) (0.0805) (1.602) 
Number of Children 
Less than 6 years old in 
Household 
-0.00957 -0.0180 -0.00109 0.0863 -0.00971 -0.0182 -7.59e-05 -0.0199 
(0.00990) (0.0142) (0.0167) (0.636) (0.00995) (0.0142) (0.0167) (0.643) 
Constant 1.972*** 1.862*** 0.557*** 11.98*** 1.972*** 1.862*** 0.557*** 11.77*** 
(0.0227) (0.0307) (0.0337) (1.768) (0.0230) (0.0310) (0.0339) (1.767) 
Observations 4,722 5,078 5,215 5,639 4,679 5,030 5,169 5,590 
R-squared 0.013 0.008 0.035 0.011 0.013 0.008 0.036 0.011 
Number of gsms 1,168 1,219 1,276 1,289   1,156 1,206 1,263 1,276 
Standard errors clustered at the individual level provided in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A8: Individual Fixed Effects Regression by Initial Household Poverty Status 
Panel A: Not in Poverty (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES 
Behavioral 
Disorder 
Symptoms 
Emotional 
Disorder 
Symptoms Conscientiousness Agreeableness Neuroticism 
            
Casino Payment? -0.242* -0.0661 0.348* 0.442* -0.0798 
(0.141) (0.176) (0.211) (0.246) (0.313) 
Initially in Poverty? N N N N N 
Observations 3,579 3,579 3,492 3,402 3,485 
R-squared 0.020 0.021 0.055 0.086 0.056 
Number of gsms 806 806 806 802 805 
Note: Individual Fixed Effects, American Indian Trend and Age Fixed Effects and Standard errors clustered at the 
individual level provided in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
Panel B: Initially in Poverty (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES 
Behavioral 
Disorder 
Symptoms 
Emotional 
Disorder 
Symptoms Conscientiousness Agreeableness Neuroticism 
            
Casino Payment? -0.182 -0.478** 0.271 0.539** 0.482* 
(0.173) (0.201) (0.221) (0.267) (0.273) 
Initially in Poverty? Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 2,471 2,471 2,401 2,293 2,395 
R-squared 0.023 0.028 0.039 0.075 0.057 
Number of gsms 599 599 596 594 595 
Note: Individual Fixed Effects, American Indian Trend and Age Fixed Effects and Standard errors clustered at the 
individual level provided in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A9: Individual Fixed Effects Regression by Number of American Indian Parents 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES 
Behavioral 
Disorder 
Symptoms 
Emotional 
Disorder 
Symptoms Conscientiousness Agreeableness Neuroticism 
            
Casino Payment: First American 
Indian Parent? 
-0.233** -0.327** 0.330** 0.454*** 0.372** 
(0.108) (0.129) (0.144) (0.175) (0.187) 
Casino Payment: Second American 
Indian Parent? 
-0.0443 -0.116 0.130 0.172 0.0431 
(0.0685) (0.0877) (0.0869) (0.108) (0.136) 
Observations 6,050 6,050 5,893 5,695 5,880 
R-squared 0.020 0.019 0.045 0.077 0.052 
Number of gsms 1,405 1,405 1,402 1,396 1,400 
Note: Individual Fixed Effects, American Indian Trend and Age Fixed Effects and Standard errors clustered at the 
individual level provided in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table A10: Individual Fixed Effects Regressions on Behavior and Emotional Disorders by Source of Reporting 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES 
Behavioral 
Disorder 
Symptoms: 
Both Reports 
Emotional 
Disorder 
Symptoms: 
Both Reports 
Behavioral 
Disorder 
Symptoms: 
Parent Report 
Alone 
Emotional 
Disorder 
Symptoms: 
Parent Report 
Alone 
Behavioral 
Disorder 
Symptoms: 
Child Report 
Alone 
Emotional 
Disorder 
Symptoms: 
Child Report 
Alone 
              
Casino 
Payment? -0.180* -0.292** -0.237** 0.0503 -0.138 -0.293** 
-0.109 -0.137 -0.103 -0.147 -0.136 -0.139 
Observations 6050 6050 6050 5809 6050 6050 
R-squared 0.019 0.019 0.013 0.027 0.008 0.014 
Number of 
gsms 1405 1405 1405 1396 1405 1405 
Note: Includes number of children less than 6 years of age, a constant and Individual Fixed Effects, American 
Indian Trend and Age Fixed Effects and Standard errors clustered at the individual level provided in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A11: Effects of Welfare Reform on Observed Outcomes by Single Parent Status 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES 
Behavioral 
Disorder 
Symptoms 
Emotional 
Disorder 
Symptoms Conscientiousness Agreeableness Neuroticism 
            
Casino Payment?  -0.149 -0.271* 0.324** 0.398** 0.215 
(0.118) (0.144) (0.152) (0.191) (0.217) 
Single Parent x Casino 
Payment -0.111 -0.0743 -0.0688 0.0524 0.185 
(0.111) (0.103) (0.129) (0.115) (0.115) 
Observations 6,050 6,050 5,893 5,695 5,880 
R-squared 0.020 0.019 0.045 0.077 0.052 
Number of gsms 1,405 1,405 1,402 1,396 1,400 
Note: Includes number of children less than 6 years of age, a constant and Individual Fixed Effects, American 
Indian Trend and Age Fixed Effects and Standard errors clustered at the individual level provided in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table A12: Comparison of Economic Characteristics with other American Indian Tribes 
  
Eastern 
Cherokee 
Other 
Tribes 
African 
Americans 
Percent of Age 25+ with a high 
school degree 0.63 0.61 0.63 
Unemployment Rate 0.108 0.104 0.129 
Per Capita Income 6944 6611 8859 
Note: Data from 1990 US Census for American Indian Reservations. Dollar figures are 
reported in 1989$. Source: Social Explorer and 1990 Characteristics of the Black 
Population, 1990 CP-3-6. 
 
 
Table A13: Three-Month Prevalence Rates of Psychiatric Disorders, by Sex and Ethnic Group 
  American Indian White 
% SE % SE 
Separation Anxiety 4.6 1.2 3.3 0.8 
Any Anxiety Disorder 5.3 1.3 5.6 1 
Any Depressive Disorder 0.3 0.3 1.5 0.5 
Conduct or Oppositional Disorder 6.5 1.4 5.3 0.8 
Attention deficit hyperactivity disorder 1.2 0.6 1.9 0.4 
Substance abuse or dependence 1.2 0.6 0.1 0.1 
Any tic disorder 1.9 0.8 4.2 1 
Enuresis or Ecopresis 4 1.1 4.8 0.9 
Core Disorders 13.3 1.9 12.2 1.3 
More than one disorder 3.1 1 3.1 0.6 
Any disorder 16.7 2.1 19.2 1.7 
Source: Costell, E. Jane, Elizabeth Farmer, Adrian Angold, Barbara Burns and Alaattin Erkanli. 1997. 
"Psychiatric Disorders among American Indian and White Youth in Appalachia: The Great Smoky Mountains 
Study." American Journal of Public Health. Volume 87, No. 5, pp. 827-832. 
 
